The Eastern Strategist
India defence export growth has become a central focus for the nation’s defence establishment, which has spent the past decade building a case that indigenous manufacturing is not merely an industrial goal but a condition for strategic autonomy. On 18 July 2026, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh made that case at an event in New Delhi, using Operation Sindoor as the central proof point. According to a Ministry of Defence statement issued by the Press Information Bureau (PIB), the minister described the operation as testimony to India’s “up-to-date, up-to-the-mark, and up-to-the-standard” military preparedness, crediting twelve years of sustained reform under the government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi.
The timing matters. Coming months after Op Sindoor was conducted, the address functioned less as an announcement than as a strategic accounting — an attempt to tie a specific military operation to a broader narrative about production targets, export ambitions, and India’s positioning as, in the minister’s words, a “credible global security partner” extending its reach from the Indian Ocean into the wider Indo-Pacific.
Why Op Sindoor is Central to the India Defence Export Argumen
Rajnath Singh told the gathering that indigenous systems including the Akash Teer counter-drone system, the Akash surface-to-air missile, and the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile were used during Op Sindoor alongside other domestically developed equipment. He framed this as evidence that the foundation laid over twelve years of reform had translated into operational capability rather than remaining a policy aspiration.
This is an official characterisation, not an independently audited combat assessment, and The Eastern Strategist presents it as such. What can be said with confidence is that the minister’s remarks reflect a deliberate government strategy: using a named, real operation to validate the Aatmanirbhar Bharat programme in front of a domestic and international audience, at a moment when India is simultaneously courting foreign defence buyers.
The Numbers Behind the India Defence Export and Self-Reliance Narrative
The PIB release lays out a set of figures that the ministry presents as measures of progress since 2014. Annual defence production reached approximately ₹1.78 lakh crore in FY 2025-26, up from around ₹40,000 crore near 2014, Rajnath Singh said. Defence exports, he added, crossed ₹38,000 crore in the same year, compared with ₹686 crore in FY 2013-14. The government’s stated targets are to exceed ₹2 lakh crore in production this year, reach ₹3 lakh crore by 2029, and push exports to ₹50,000 crore by 2029.
These figures originate from the minister’s address and should be read as official government claims rather than externally verified statistics. They are nonetheless significant as policy signals: they indicate that New Delhi intends defence manufacturing to scale by roughly 70 percent in production value and by more than 30 percent in export value within three years — an aggressive trajectory that will require sustained industrial capacity, consistent supply chains, and export demand to match.
Indigenisation has also been formalised through a structured listing process. Five positive indigenisation lists issued by the armed forces now cover 509 items, the minister said, alongside five further lists from the Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSUs) covering 5,012 items. Another list is expected to be notified soon. Procurement policy has been adjusted in parallel: 75 percent of the budget allocated for defence modernisation is now earmarked for Indian industry, and the forthcoming Defence Acquisition Procedure (DAP) is expected to prioritise the “Buy Indian–Indigenously Designed, Developed and Manufactured” category.
Corridors, Corporatisation and the Industrial Base
Two defence industrial corridors — in Uttar Pradesh and Tamil Nadu — form the physical backbone of this push. Rajnath Singh said approximately ₹70,000 crore in investment has been proposed for the two corridors, with about ₹10,000 crore already invested, and described the Uttar Pradesh corridor in particular as an example of the Aatmanirbhar Bharat model working as intended. Companies operating within these corridors, he said, are increasingly integrating into global supply chains, though the ministry did not name specific firms or contracts in this address.
The restructuring extends to state-owned production as well. The corporatisation of the Ordnance Factory Board, the minister said, was intended to make the erstwhile factories more responsive and accountable, and he characterised the units as having moved from loss-making entities to profitable ones. The Eastern Strategist notes that this transition — completed in 2021 through the creation of seven new defence public sector undertakings — has been debated by unions and analysts on grounds of labour transition and long-term efficiency gains; the minister’s remarks represent the government’s own assessment of that outcome.
Innovation as a Second Track
Alongside heavy manufacturing, the government is pointing to a start-up and innovation ecosystem as evidence of a broader technological base. Through the Innovations for Defence Excellence (iDEX) programme and its associated schemes — iDEX Prime and the Acing Development of Innovative Technologies with iDEX (ADITI) scheme — the ministry said procurement worth more than ₹2,400 crore has been approved from start-ups and micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs), with projects worth over ₹1,500 crore sanctioned for emerging technologies. As of March 2026, 676 start-ups and innovators have engaged through iDEX, with 551 contracts signed. The minister said the number of defence-focused start-ups has grown from a few dozen in 2018 to more than 2,000 today.
DRDO, in this account, has evolved from a pure research organisation into what the minister called a national innovation platform linking industry, academia, start-ups and scientists — part of an ecosystem that also includes DPSUs, private manufacturers, and more than 17,000 MSMEs.
From Military Engagement to Industrial Diplomacy
The address also reframed India’s approach to defence partnerships. Rajnath Singh argued that Indian defence diplomacy is no longer confined to joint exercises and dialogue but now extends to technology cooperation, joint production, and integration into global supply chains. He cited Prime Minister Modi’s recent visits to Indonesia, Australia and New Zealand as examples: cooperation on the BrahMos missile system and the restoration of the Prambanan Temple with Indonesia, uranium supply arrangements with Australia, and an expansion of trade with New Zealand.
This pattern is consistent with India’s existing network of defence relationships. Russia remains the largest legacy partner through platforms such as the Su-30MKI fighter, T-90 tanks, the BrahMos programme itself, and the S-400 air defence system. The United States has become a significant supplier of maritime surveillance aircraft, helicopters and intelligence-sharing arrangements that support interoperability in the Indo-Pacific. France supplies the Rafale fighter and Scorpene-class submarines, while Israel remains a key partner for missiles, radars, drones and electronic warfare systems. Layered onto these established ties are newer maritime security and capacity-building arrangements with Japan, Australia, Indonesia and Vietnam — a diversification strategy that reduces India’s dependence on any single supplier while expanding its own footprint as a provider, not just a buyer.
What the Claims Leave Unaddressed
Several structural questions remain outside the scope of the minister’s address. India continues to depend on foreign suppliers for critical technologies, most notably advanced aircraft engines and certain high-end propulsion systems — a gap that domestic production figures do not resolve on their own. Meeting the stated export target of ₹50,000 crore by 2029 will require Indian firms to compete against established exporters such as the United States, France, Russia, Israel, South Korea and Türkiye, all of which have decades of operational track record, mature after-sales networks, and existing customer relationships that are difficult to displace.
Long-term maintenance, spares, upgrades and training — rather than the initial sale — are typically what determine whether a defence export relationship endures. The PIB release and the minister’s remarks are silent on how India intends to build out this after-sales infrastructure at the scale its export ambitions imply. Similarly, while the indigenisation lists and iDEX contract numbers indicate breadth of activity, they do not by themselves demonstrate depth of technological capability in the categories that matter most for export competitiveness, such as engines, sensors and high-end electronic warfare systems.
What to Watch Next
The forthcoming Defence Acquisition Procedure, expected to be unveiled later this year, will be the first concrete test of whether the “Buy Indian-IDDM” prioritisation translates into measurable changes in procurement outcomes. The next positive indigenisation list, described by the minister as imminent, will indicate whether the government is moving toward higher-value or more strategically sensitive categories, or continuing to expand breadth at the margins. On the export side, whether India’s FY 2026-27 defence production and export figures track toward the ₹2 lakh crore and ₹50,000 crore markers — respectively for this year and by 2029 — will be the clearest indicator of whether Saturday’s rhetoric is being matched by delivery. Progress on indigenous aero-engine development, an area where India has historically lagged, will also remain a key signal of how far self-reliance can realistically extend in the near term.
