Indian refiners can keep buying Russian crude without facing a 100 per cent US tariff, for as long as Washington chooses to leave it that way. The Russia sanctions waiver that President Donald Trump signed on 16 October suspends the duties of the Graham Act two days before they were due on 18 October. The same order tells the US Trade Representative (USTR) to keep reporting on who is still buying.
The sanctions law itself has not gone anywhere. The Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act of 2026, signed on 18 September, remains on the statute book, and the Russia sanctions waiver lasts only until the President or the Secretary of State decides otherwise. Three questions follow for New Delhi: what exactly was switched off, what refiners can plan around, and who now holds the authority to switch it back on.
The Russia Sanctions Waiver Suspends the Duties but Keeps the Law in Force
Under the order dated 16 October 2026, Trump used the national-interest power in section 115 of the Graham Act to waive the duties in sections 112 and 113 and the sanctions in sections 102(a), 102(d), 102(e), 103 to 111 and 117. The Act stays on the books. Sanctions imposed under earlier Russia-related executive orders are unaffected, according to the White House text.
The penalties on offer were heavy. Section 2 of the order set a 500 per cent increase in duty on goods from Russia, a 100 per cent increase on goods from the five largest importers of Russian crude and natural gas that knowingly made new purchases on or after 18 October, and a 100 per cent increase on goods from the five leading facilitators of Russian oil sanctions evasion. The order names no country in either group of five.
| Measure | What the order set out | Status after 16 October |
|---|---|---|
| Duty on goods from Russia | +500 per cent | Waived (sections 112, 113) |
| Duty on the five largest buyers of Russian crude and gas | +100 per cent on new purchases from 18 October 2026 | Waived (sections 112, 113) |
| Duty on the five top facilitators of evasion | +100 per cent | Waived (sections 112, 113) |
| Sanctions in sections 102(a), 102(d), 102(e), 103 to 111, 117 | Sanctions on foreign persons and restrictions on persons | Waived |
| Sanctions under earlier Russia executive orders | In force before the Act | Unaffected |
The order records that Trump has sent Congress the certification section 115 requires, with a report on its basis. The published text does not reproduce that reasoning. Kirill Dmitriev, Russia’s investment envoy, called the waiver “a truly historic moment”, which is a Moscow claim about what the legislation would have cost Russia and not a finding of fact.
Figure: Key dates, 18 September to 22 October 2026. Source: White House order, OFAC General License 135, US State Department announcement.
Indian Refiners Keep Their October Volumes but Gain No Planning Horizon
Kpler’s trade-flow estimates put India’s Russian crude imports at about 1.82 million barrels per day in September, ahead of China’s 1.49 million, and project October at 1.8 to 1.9 million. On those figures the Russia sanctions waiver protects current buying and does not alter it. Volumes remain well below the highs seen earlier this year.
What the waiver does not supply is a date. The diesel licence the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued on 9 October, General License 135, runs to 7 April 2027. The Russia sanctions waiver of 16 October has no end date. Section 4 says the waivers stay in effect until the President or the Secretary of State determines that further action is appropriate. For a refiner that books cargoes weeks ahead, that is a risk with nothing to plan against.
New Delhi’s stated position is that it follows sanctions mandated by the UN Security Council and not unilateral measures. The Russia sanctions waiver does not touch that position. It changes how much US tariff risk attaches to Indian purchases in the near term, which the 27 September TES analysis of the 30-day tariff clock on Indian refiners had flagged as the main uncertainty.
USTR’s Standing Watch Makes the Waiver Revocable by Administrative Decision
Section 3 directs the US Trade Representative, in consultation with the Secretaries of State, Treasury and Energy, to monitor which countries buy Russian crude and gas and to report regularly to the President. It also requires prompt notice of any circumstance that might call for further action, including on the waivers. Under the Russia sanctions waiver, the review machinery stays live while the penalties stay suspended.
Sections 2(b) and 2(c) also ask USTR to identify the top five importers and the top five facilitators. Those lists, once compiled, would be the first official ranking of who Washington counts as a major buyer. Kpler’s September estimates place India ahead of China, and TES assesses that New Delhi should expect to appear on any such list.
Section 5 delegates the section 115 power to grant or end the Russia sanctions waiver to the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Treasury Secretary and the Trade Representative. That office is held by Marco Rubio, who the US State Department said will be in India from 17 to 22 October, with stops in Mumbai and Jamnagar, where Reliance Industries runs its refining complex. US Ambassador Sergio Gor has described the trip as business focused.
The overlap is a matter of calendar, not evidence of intent. It still means the official who can revive the duty will spend this week engaging Indian business leaders, while the India–US trade talks sit on what Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman described earlier this month as a plateau. Neither side has announced a deal.
Washington’s Russian Oil Policy Has Tracked Fuel Prices Since March
The Russia sanctions waiver of 16 October is the latest in a sequence of US relaxations on Russian energy. On 5 March, Treasury allowed Indian refiners to buy Russian oil already loaded on ships for 30 days, to keep supply moving during the Hormuz disruption, as TES reported at the time. On 9 October came the diesel licence. On 16 October, the Graham Act duties were suspended.
Each step arrived while fuel prices were under pressure. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent described the March waiver as deliberately short-term and said it would not give Russia significant financial benefit. A legal note on General License 135 places that licence against rising diesel prices worldwide. TES assesses that the common thread is price management, with sanctions policy adjusting around it. The opinion piece on the Russian diesel licence and the analysis of Hormuz oil flows trace the same pattern from the supply side.
The posture was sharper in 2025. Reporting around the March waiver recalled that Washington had put tariffs of 50 per cent on India, including a 25 per cent levy tied to Russian oil, before a February 2026 trade deal brought the rate to 18 per cent.
Congress has not stood aside. On 11 October, four Republican and three Democratic senators issued a joint statement saying the diesel licence runs counter to a 2022 law, according to a legal summary of the episode. The Graham Act itself passed with bipartisan support. A waiver that members of both parties dislike is one whose life can be shortened.
India has seen a waiver clause outlast its first purpose before. In August 2018, the US Senate voted 87 to 10 for a defence bill that let the President waive Russia-related sanctions under the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), after then Defence Secretary James Mattis argued that partners such as India needed spare parts for Russian-origin equipment. India signed its S-400 air-defence contract that October, and no CAATSA penalty was imposed on it. The waiver became a standing posture and not a one-off exception.
What New Delhi Can Plan Around Before Rubio Leaves on 22 October
Five markers will show how durable the Russia sanctions waiver is over the coming weeks:
- What Rubio says about Russian crude during his stops in Mumbai and Jamnagar.
- Whether USTR names its top five importers and top five facilitators, and where India sits.
- Whether the Senate objection to Russian diesel spreads to the Graham Act waiver.
- Whether the India–US trade talks move past the plateau Sitharaman described.
- Whether Hormuz flows keep recovering. Falling price pressure would weaken the motive for leniency.
Indian refiners have not waited on Washington to build room for manoeuvre. India reportedly began cutting Russian purchases from late 2025 and raised its US crude buying, and Kpler’s figures show September volumes below the mid-year peak. That flexibility is the asset no waiver order can add or remove.
The working assumption in South Block and in refinery planning rooms should be a window of unknown length. Cargoes bought this month carry no new US duty. What follows depends on a decision that now sits with the Secretary of State and a watch list kept by USTR. In 2018 India completed its purchase and Washington adjusted around it. TES expects the same discipline to guide Indian refiners now: buy where price and security of supply point, and keep sourcing flexible enough to turn if the Russia sanctions waiver ends.
Source note: White House executive order of 16 October 2026, OFAC General License 135, US State Department announcements, Kpler trade-flow estimates and wire reporting. Assessments are marked as TES analysis.
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