Strategic Analysis · Indian Ocean · The Eastern Strategist
A base roughly 4,000 km from Iran has frozen a treaty that India welcomed as the end of Mauritius’s decolonisation. On 18 October, the Telegraph reported Lord Hermer’s claim that Donald Trump withdrew support for the Chagos Islands deal because London refused to back the Iran war. The same report says UK ministers have conceded the agreement is effectively dead. Prime Minister Andy Burnham says he is confident of a solution with Washington.
For New Delhi, the outcome is not its to decide. India’s position on Chagos is on the official record, and so is its stake in Mauritius.
The Chagos Islands Deal Was Signed in May 2025 and Has Not Entered Into Force
The UK and Mauritius signed the treaty on 22 May 2025. It transfers sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago to Mauritius and lets the UK keep Diego Garcia, the site of the joint UK-US base, under a 99-year lease. More than a year on, it has not taken effect. In April 2026 the UK told Parliament that the implementing legislation could not complete its passage in the 2024-26 session.
Washington’s position on the Chagos deal has swung. The US State Department backed the UK’s decision to proceed in February 2026, and Trump attacked the deal a day later. On 22 September, at his first meeting with Burnham in New York, he called it “terrible”. Defence Secretary Wes Streeting said the next day that Britain would go back to the drawing board and would not make the annual lease payments “at this stage”.
Mauritius is pressing its case. Prime Minister Navin Ramgoolam has said sovereignty is not negotiable and that Mauritius is exploring legal avenues. The Maldives has told the Telegraph it is weighing its own options. Reports say London is considering waiting until Trump leaves office in January 2029.
Diego Garcia Turned an Indian Ocean Treaty Into an Iran War Question
Diego Garcia is the joint UK-US base from which American bombers operate, and the Iran war has placed it at the centre of the dispute. In March 2026 the UK Defence Secretary said two Iranian missiles were launched in the direction of the base and that neither got close. Iran denies firing them and calls the claim an Israeli false flag.
The UK first held back, then agreed that US forces could use Diego Garcia and RAF Fairford for what its Ministry of Defence called “specific and limited defensive operations”. Trump had already linked the base to Iran in February, writing that the US might need it if Tehran refused a deal. TES’s earlier look at the strain on UK defence covers the base’s role. TES reads his opposition through that lens: the dispute is over control of the base, not the title to the islands.
Hermer’s claim fits that sequence, but it is one account from one outlet. TES has not seen a government statement confirming that the UK barred US use of the base, or that this is why Trump changed his position.
India’s Position on the Chagos Islands Deal Is Principle-Based and on the Record
The Ministry of External Affairs welcomed the UK-Mauritius understanding on 3 October 2024 and the signed treaty on 22 May 2025. It called the treaty a milestone that completes Mauritius’s decolonisation. Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri told reporters on 12 March 2025 that India supports Mauritius’s stance on sovereignty over Chagos.
The India-Mauritius Joint Vision for an Enhanced Strategic Partnership, issued on 12 March 2025, records that the Prime Minister reiterated India’s firm support to Mauritius on the Chagos issue. Mauritius thanked him for his personal engagement with global leaders. India has framed this as decolonisation and respect for territorial integrity, not as a stand on the base.
TES found no Indian statement on the stall itself. That silence is consistent with its position: it backs the principle and leaves the UK-US basing question to London, Washington and Port Louis.
Agaléga Is Why the Wording of India’s Chagos Deal Support Matters
Agaléga is Mauritian territory where India has built an airstrip and a jetty, and the official record calls them development assets. The 2015 memorandum covers improving sea and air connectivity and enhancing the capabilities of the Mauritian Defence Forces on the outer island. The PMO said the facilities, inaugurated on 29 February 2024, would strengthen connectivity, maritime security and socio-economic development.
The 2025 joint vision commits both sides to “enhanced utilisation” of the runway and jetty to secure Mauritius’s exclusive economic zone. Mauritius has denied any base. Then Prime Minister Pravind Jugnauth told his parliament in May 2021 there was no agreement for one, and repeated that at the 2024 inauguration. The 2015 memorandum itself has not been published, and Jugnauth cited a confidentiality clause in 2022.
Media reports have alleged an Indian naval facility, and Al Jazeera’s 2021 investigation said so. Both governments reject that, and TES reports it as a claim only. Mauritian critics have compared Agaléga with the 1965 separation of Chagos. For India, supporting Mauritian sovereignty at Chagos while being read as building a base at Agaléga is the credibility problem.
TES assessment: that is why careful language about Agaléga is not cosmetic. India’s standing on Chagos rests partly on how its own island projects are described.
What India Can Do Is Deepen the Mauritius Partnership
India cannot ratify a UK treaty or reopen a US decision on the Chagos deal. What it controls is delivery on the partnership it has already announced. The Joint Vision commits India to a National Maritime Information Sharing Centre, more joint surveillance and hydrographic surveys, and support for Coast Guard refits. External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar announced a Defence Attaché for Mauritius in April 2026. India also chairs the Indian Ocean Rim Association for 2025-26.
TES assessment: these steps give India influence without any claim on Diego Garcia. If the Chagos Islands deal stays parked, Mauritius will look for partners who deliver, and India’s record at Agaléga, in the coast guard and in hydrography is its best argument, and TES has mapped India’s wider Indian Ocean basing logic. The risk is the opposite reading, that Delhi is simply acquiring facilities, which is why India’s official language stresses Mauritian ownership.
What to Watch After the Chagos Islands Deal Stall
Is the Chagos Islands deal dead?
The Telegraph reports UK ministers have conceded it is effectively dead, while Burnham says he is confident of a solution. TES has not seen a formal withdrawal.
What will Mauritius do?
Ramgoolam has threatened legal action and says sovereignty is not negotiable. Burnham said on 21 September that foreign ministers should meet at the United Nations.
Will India say anything?
TES found nothing on record since the stall. Watch the MEA’s weekly briefing and any India-Mauritius meeting for a restatement of support.
The clock now belongs to Mauritius, not Washington. If London waits until January 2029 to revive the treaty, Port Louis may not. India’s task in the meantime is to make its own island partnership with Mauritius the most credible one in the ocean.
Source note: MEA and PMO statements, UK and Mauritian government statements as reported, and press reports of remarks by UK ministers and officials. Claims by Iran, Israel and individual officials are attributed.
